Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition by Patrick Bajari et al.












We have had very helpful conversations with Victor Aguirregabiria, Jeremy Fox, Phil Haile, Igal Hendel,
Guido Imbens, Phillip Leslie, Ariel Pakes, Peter Reiss, Azeem Shaikh, Elie Tamer, and Ed Vytlacil as well
as seminar participants at University of Minnesota, University of Wisconsin, and the SITE Applied
Microeconomics workshop. We are also indebted to Matthew Osborne for providing exemplary research
assistance. Bajari and Benkard thank the NSF and the Bureau of Economic Analysis for supporting this
research. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
©2004 by Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text,
not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source. Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
Patrick Bajari, C. Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin
NBER Working Paper No. 10450
April 2004
JEL No. L0, C5
ABSTRACT
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior
is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of
motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural parameters
are estimated using the optimality conditions for equilibrium. The second step estimator is a simple
simulated minimum distance estimator. The algorithm applies to a broad class of models, including
I.O. models with both discrete and continuous controls such as the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model.
We test the algorithm on a class of dynamic discrete choice models with normally distributed errors,


















In many branches of applied economics, it is now common practice to estimate struc-
tural models of decision making and equilibrium. In most cases, however, attention has
been focused on static environments. Estimating dynamic parameters has been seen as
substantially more diﬃcult, both conceptually and computationally. To the extent that
previous work has succeeded in estimating dynamic models, it has, with a few notable
exceptions described below, been limited to single-agent problems. Of course, many of
the parameters at the heart of policy debates are inherently dynamic, such as entry
and exit costs, the returns to advertising or R&D, or adjustment costs of investment.
Dynamics are also of particular interest in industrial organization. For instance, models
incorporating network eﬀects, durable goods, experience goods, consumer learning, or
ﬁrm learning-by-doing are inherently dynamic.
One reason that empirical work on dynamic competition has been limited is the perceived
diﬃculty of incorporating information from a dynamic equilibrium into an estimation
algorithm. The literature on dynamic oligopoly, including Ericson and Pakes (1995),
Pakes and McGuire (1994, 2001), Gowrisankaran and Town (1997), Benkard (forthcom-
ing), has shown that computing an equilibrium for even the simplest of industries is all
but prohibitive. For models with the complexity usually required for empirical work,
the situation is even more bleak. Even with advancing computer technology, computing
equilibria over and over, as would be required in a typical estimation routine, seems out
of the question. Moreover, dynamic games typically admit a vast multiplicity of equi-
libria. This multiplicity greatly complicates the application of estimators that require
computing equilibria and then matching these equilibria to observed data.
This paper develops a method for estimating dynamic models of imperfect competition
that is straightforward to apply, without requiring the ability to compute an equilibrium
even once. The approach involves two steps. The ﬁrst is to recover the agents’ policy
functions, as well as the probability distributions determining the evolution of the ob-
served and unobserved state variables. In practice, this would typically involve running a
nonparametric regression of observed actions (such as investment, quantity, price, entry
or exit) on the observed state variables (such as aggregate demand/cost shifters, and ﬁrm
and product characteristics). A feature of equilibrium models is that agents understand
and have correct beliefs about their environment and the behavior of other agents. As
a consequence, by recovering the probability distributions for actions and states, one is
eﬀectively recovering the agents’ beliefs at each point in time.
The second step of the approach involves ﬁnding the set of parameters that makes the ob-
served policies optimal. This parallels the second feature of equilibrium models, namely
1that agents maximize expected discounted proﬁts given their beliefs. These optimiza-
tion conditions can be represented as a system of inequalities requiring that each agent’s
observed choice at each state be weakly preferred to all feasible alternatives. The struc-
tural parameters are estimated as the solution to this system of inequalities. In practice,
this involves applying a simple simulated minimum distance estimator that minimizes
violations of the optimality conditions.
Our approach relates most closely to that of Hotz and Miller (1993), and Hotz et al.
(1993). Hotz and Miller (1993) showed, in a single agent dynamic discrete choice problem,
that knowledge of the probability distribution over an agent’s choices is suﬃcient to
derive the agent’s value function. They used this result to develop a two stage estimation
approach in which the choice probabilities were estimated in the ﬁrst stage, and then
the structural parameters estimated in the second stage. Several recent papers similar
to our own have greatly extended these ideas in the contexts of dynamic discrete games
(Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002a)), entry games (Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2003),
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)), and dynamic auction games (Jofre-Benet and
Pesendorfer (forthcoming)).
This paper makes several contributions to this literature. The ﬁrst is that the estimation
algorithm is applicable to a wider class of models than previous methods. A limitation of
the existing literature is that it requires discrete actions (such as entry or exit) with each
alternative subject to an idiosyncratic proﬁt/cost shock. This rules out many important
dynamic problems in I.O. such as investment games (e.g., Ericson and Pakes (1995)),
dynamic pricing games (durable goods, network eﬀects, learning by doing, et al.), as well
as entry games where data is also available on investment or prices. One of the primary
contributions of this paper is that the algorithm described applies equally to all of these
cases. For example, in section 5.1 we apply the estimator to a single agent dynamic
discrete choice problem similar to that of Rust (1987) with normally distributed errors.
In section 5.2 we apply the estimator to a version of the Pakes and McGuire (1994) model
that has both discrete (entry and exit) and continuous (investment) controls. To our
knowledge, none of the estimation algorithms in the previous literature can be applied
to this second example.1
The other main contributions of the paper are computational. A key point that greatly
reduces the computational burden of the algorithm is that many dynamic games are lin-
ear in the parameters of interest. The argument is as follows: assuming agents maximize
the expected discounted value of future proﬁts, if the period return function is linear in
the parameters, then the value function can also be written as linear in the parameters.
1Note that Berry and Pakes (2000) also address the issue of continuous controls by using an euler-
equation based estimator. However, it is not currently known how to incorporate information from
discrete controls into this estimator.
2This linearity can be exploited to achieve a substantial computational savings because
it means that the parameters of interest essentially factor out of the value function.
Thus, the simulated expected discounted value terms in the value function need only be
computed once and then held ﬁxed for all parameter values, rather than recomputed at
every parameter value as would be typical. We also obtain computational savings over
the previous literature by making heavier use of simulation.
One beneﬁt of the two-stage approach in the context of dynamic games is that it some-
what mitigates the multiple equilibrium problem. Because equilibrium beliefs are recov-
ered from the observed data, the researcher need not take a stand on which of many
potential equilibria is being played. Instead, this determination is made by the observed
data.
The algorithm also extends easily to models that are not point identiﬁed. In many models
involving discrete controls, such as entry models, some parameters may not be point
identiﬁable from the observed policy functions. Instead, even with an inﬁnite amount of
data, it might only be possible to place the parameters within some set. Examples can
be found in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003), Haile and Tamer
(2003), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003). In other cases, an identiﬁcation
proof may simply be diﬃcult to obtain. The estimation algorithm can be applied to
these cases with little alteration while being agnostic on the issue of identiﬁcation. In
that case it produces bounds on the parameters of interest.
The primary cost to employing a two-stage approach is that the approach does not uti-
lize all of the information available from the structural model. Some eﬃciency is lost
because the ﬁrst stage policy function estimates are typically performed nonparametri-
cally, without being informed by the structure of the model. Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002b) show in the single agent context that two-step estimators may perform poorly
relative to estimators that incorporate more information, for example, by iterating the
Bellman equation. In many contexts that interest us, this ineﬃciency is inescapable be-
cause iterating the Bellman equation mapping even once would often be computationally
infeasible. Furthermore, in the context of a dynamic game, the Bellman equation is not
a contraction mapping so there is no guarantee that iterating it a small number of times
would improve the eﬃciency of the estimates. Given this eﬃciency loss, one question of
interest is whether the two stage approach is eﬃcient enough to provide good estimates
with reasonably sized data sets.
To answer this question, we evaluate the eﬃciency and computational burden of the
estimators using monte carlo experiments on the two examples mentioned above. We ﬁnd
that the algorithm has very low computational burden. We also ﬁnd that the algorithm
works surprisingly well even for relatively small data sets, containing fewer observations
3than one might reasonably ﬁnd in real world applications. For example, in the dynamic
oligopoly example, we ﬁnd that with a moderately sized data set it is possible to recover
the entry cost distribution nonparametrically (ignoring all prior information about its
parametric form) with acceptable precision.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the class of models that
we are interested in, and provides two speciﬁc examples. Sections 3 and 4 outline the
estimation algorithm and provide the relevant asymptotic theory. Section 5 details how
the algorithm applies to the two examples and provides monte carlo evidence on the
performance of the estimator. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
This section outlines a model of dynamic competition between oligopolistic competitors
that encompasses many applications in industrial organization. Examples that ﬁt into
the general framework include entry and exit decisions, dynamic pricing, and investments
in capital stock, advertising, or research and development. The deﬁning feature of the
model is that actions taken in a given period aﬀect future payoﬀs, and future strategic
interaction, by inﬂuencing a set of commonly observed state variables. The model also
includes single agent dynamic decision problems as a special case; the single agent model
is just a game with a single player. We solve the model using the concept of Markov
Perfect Equilibrium.
The model consists of N ﬁrms, denoted by i = 1,...,N, who make decisions at times
t = 0,1,2,...,∞. At a given time, t, the prevailing conditions are summarized by a
vector of state variables, st ∈ S ⊂ RG. Relevant state variables might include the ﬁrms’
production capacities, their technological progress up to time t, the current market
shares, stocks of consumer loyalty, or simply the set of ﬁrms that are incumbent in the
market. We assume that these state variables are commonly observed by the ﬁrms.
Given the state st at date t, the ﬁrms simultaneously choose actions. Depending on
the application, the ﬁrms’ actions could include decisions about whether to enter or
exit the market, investment or advertising levels, or choices about prices and quantities.
We denote ﬁrm i’s action at date t as ait ∈ Ai. We also assume that before choosing
its action each ﬁrm, i, observes a private shock νit ∈ R, drawn independently from a
distribution G(·|st).2 Private information might derive from variability in marginal costs
2We assume ﬁrm i’s private shock is a single scalar variable, as would be natural if we wanted to
ultimately estimate i’s decision rule with a logit or probit model. There is no conceptual diﬃculty in
allowing the shock to be multi-dimensional, which would be convenient if, for instance, we ultimately
4of production, or the need for plant maintenance, or from variability in sunk costs of
entry or exit. We denote the vector of private shocks as νt = (ν1t,...,νNt).
In each period, each ﬁrm earns proﬁts equal to πi(at,st,νit). Each ﬁrm, i, is interested





We assume ﬁrms have a common discount factor β.
The ﬁnal aspect of the model is to specify the transitions between states. We assume
that the state at date t + 1, denoted st+1, is drawn from a probability distribution
P(st+1|st,at). The dependence of P(·|st,at) on the current period actions at reﬂects
the fact that some time t decisions may aﬀect future payoﬀs, as is clearly the case if
the relevant decision being modeled is an entry/exit decision or a long-term investment.
Of course, not all the state variables necessarily depend on past actions; for instance,
one component of the state could be a transitory iid shock that aﬀects only the current
payoﬀs — for instance, iid shocks to market demand.
We are interested in equilibrium behavior for the model we have just outlined. Because
the ﬁrms interact repeatedly, and the horizon is inﬁnite, there are likely to be very many
Nash, and even subgame perfect equilibria, possibly involving complex behavioral rules.
We focus instead on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE).
A Markov strategy for ﬁrm i describes the ﬁrm’s behavior at time t as a function of the
commonly observed state variables and ﬁrm i’s private information at time t. Formally,
it is a map, σi : S × R → Ai. A proﬁle of Markov strategies is a vector, σ = (σ1,...,σn),
where σ : S × Rn → A.
If behavior is given by a Markov proﬁle σ, ﬁrm i’s present discounted proﬁts from the








A Markov strategy proﬁle, σ, is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if there is no ﬁrm, i, and
alternative Markov strategy, σ0
i, such that ﬁrm i prefers the strategy σ0
i to the strategy
σi given its opponents use the strategy proﬁle σ−i. That is, σ is a MPE if for all ﬁrms,




wanted to estimate i’s decision rule with a multinomial logit model.
5A useful simpliﬁcation to verify that each ﬁrm’s strategy is indeed a best-response to
the strategies of the other ﬁrms is to make use of Bellman’s principle of optimality. By
principle of optimality, to check that σi is an optimal strategy given opponent strategies,
σ−i, it suﬃces to check that, for all pairs, (s,νi), the action σi(s,νi) leads to higher
expected discounted proﬁts than any other action ai ∈ Ai given that ﬁrm i will continue
to use its strategy σi for all future decisions. This simpliﬁcation will prove useful in the
estimation procedure below.
We will make extensive use of the set of inequalities deﬁning equilibrium in the estimation
procedure. The key idea is that if one knows β, and is able to recover σ(s,ν) and P(s0|a,s)
through some ﬁrst-stage estimation, we can use the equilibrium inequalities to recover
at least some information, and perhaps complete information, about the unknown per-
period proﬁt function πi(a,s,νi).
Before turning to the econometric methods, however, we ﬁrst introduce two simple ex-
amples to illustrate the model. We return to these examples in Section 5 where we test
the estimation procedure using simulated data.
2.1 Example 1: Dynamic Discrete Choice
Perhaps the simplest example of the model is dynamic discrete choice problems.3 In
dynamic discrete choice problems, there is a single agent who chooses a single action, a,
out of a ﬁnite set of actions, A. The state includes variables, s, that are observed by the
economist, and a vector, ν, of unobserved state variables. The period proﬁts that agent
i receives from choice j is
π(aj,s,ν) = ˜ π(aj,s;θ) + ν(aj), (2)
where ˜ π is a known (up to θ) parametric function that depends on the choice and the
vector of state variables, and ν(aj) is a stochastic shock to preferences.
For example, consider the machine replacement problem in Rust (1987). In Rust (1987)
there is a single manager who owns a machine that operates in every period. The state
variable is the machine’s age st ∈ {1,....,M}. At each date the manager chooses whether
to replace the machine (at = 1) or maintain it (at = 0), in which case the machine
ages by one period until it reaches age M, after which it remains M years old until it is
replaced.
3Dynamic discrete choice has received considerable attention in the past literature, including Rust
(1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz et al. (1993), and Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2002b).
6The manager’s per-period payoﬀ is:
π(at,st,νt) =

−θst − νt if at = 0
−R if at = 1
,
where θst+νt represents the (random) cost of maintaining the machine and the parame-
ter R is the cost of machine replacement. In this example, a Markov policy is a function,
σ(s,ν), specifying whether the machine should be maintained or replaced. It is straight-
forward to show that an optimal policy takes the form of a cut-oﬀ rule: σ(s,ν) = 1 if
ν ≥ ν∗(s), where ν∗(·) is decreasing in the machine age s, consistent with the idea that
older machines are more likely to be replaced.
2.2 Example 2: Dynamic Oligopoly
The next example represents a class of dynamic oligopoly problems similar to that of
Ericson and Pakes (1995) and Pakes and McGuire (1994).
In this class of models, there are a set of incumbent ﬁrms competing in a market. Firms
are heterogeneous, with diﬀerences across ﬁrms described by their state variables, sit.
Each period, ﬁrms choose their investment levels, Iit ≥ 0, so as to improve their state the
next period. Investment outcomes are random, and a ﬁrm’s own investment is assumed
not to inﬂuence the investment outcomes of other ﬁrms.
Examples of models that are consistent with this framework include:
(i) Firms’ state variables could represent product quality, where investment stochas-
tically improves product quality. In this example, investment could either be tech-
nological or it could be in the form of advertising.
(ii) Firms’ state variables could represent capital stock, where investment stochastically
increases a ﬁrm’s capital stock.
Firms earn proﬁts by competing in a spot market. Because quantity and price are
assumed not to inﬂuence the evolution of the state variables, they are determined in
static equilibrium conditional on the current state. The period return function is given
by
πi(at,st,νit;θ) = qit(st,pt;θ1)(pit − mc(sit,qit;θ2)) − C(Iit,νit;θ3), (3)
where qit is quantity produced by ﬁrm i in period t, pt is the vector of prices, mc is
the marginal cost of production, νit represents a private shock to the cost of investment,
7θ = (θ1,θ2,θ3) is a parameter vector to be estimated, and we have assumed that the
spot market equilibrium is Nash in prices.4
The model also allows for entry and exit. Each period, each incumbent ﬁrm has the
option of exiting the market and receiving a scrap value, Ψ, which is the same for all
ﬁrms.5 There is also one potential entrant each period with entry cost, xe. The entrant
enters if the expected discounted value of entering exceeds the entry cost. The entry
cost is private information. However, the distribution of entry costs, F(xe), is commonly
known.
A detailed example follows in section 5.2.3.
3 Estimation: Overview
3.1 First Step
The estimation approach has two steps. The ﬁrst step is to estimate the policy func-
tions, σi : S × R → Ai, and the state transition probabilities, P(st+1|st,at), using past
observations of play in the game. In practice, the best methods for doing this depend on
the details of the application, making a general treatment diﬃcult. We therefore reserve
a detailed discussion of the ﬁrst step estimation to a discussion of the two examples in
section 5, and provide only an overview here.
The ﬁrst step estimation would typically involve a variety of econometric techniques.
Because the state transition probabilities are model primitives, they would typically be
parameterized and estimated using parametric methods such as maximum likelihood.
The policy functions, on the other hand, result from equilibrium play, and would typi-
cally be estimated nonparametrically, even if the parametric form of the proﬁt function
were known. For example, in the dynamic oligopoly model presented above, the policy
functions could be estimated by running nonparametric regressions of investment, entry,
and exit on the state variables. In many cases it would also be possible to estimate some
of the proﬁt function parameters in the ﬁrst stage using techniques such as demand
estimation or production function estimation. For example, in the dynamic oligopoly
model, the demand and cost functions would typically be estimated this way.
Note, however, that the ability to estimate the ﬁrst stage is by no means guaranteed. In
4It would not complicate the model to assume instead Nash in quantities.
5It would not complicate the model to have the exit cost be random.
8practice, there are three main diﬃculties that might arise. Consider ﬁrst the simple case
where all the variables, (a,s), are observed and equilibrium is unique. Even under these
strict conditions it may not be possible to completely recover the ﬁrst stage functions
because not all states, s ∈ S, may be visited inﬁnitely often under the Markov chain of
states, P(st+1|st), that is generated by equilibrium play. At best, the policy functions
can only be recovered for states visited recurrently on the equilibrium path, or on the
recurrent class of states, R ⊆ S. As a simple example of this, in an industry such
that equilibrium play always leads to at least two incumbent ﬁrms, it is impossible to
use the data to learn nonparametrically how a ﬁrm would behave if it were to be an
incumbent monopolist. We will revisit this issue further below because it can aﬀect the
identiﬁability of certain model parameters.
Next, suppose that all variables are observed but there are multiple equilibria to the
game. In that case, so long as the data comes from only one market observed over time,
the existence of multiple equilibria to the game does not aﬀect the ability to estimate the
ﬁrst stage. The reason is that, assuming s is a complete description of the state variables
of the model, agents can only form beliefs based on s. In equilibrium, agents’ beliefs
must be correct. Therefore, by standard results in nonparametrics, their beliefs must
be recoverable from observed play. The time when multiple equilibria might interfere
with estimation of the ﬁrst stage would be when pooling together data for agents in
disconnected markets, because it might be that diﬀerent equilibria were being played
in each market. In that case the policy functions would be diﬀerent in each market, so
pooling the data across markets would lead to incorrect inferences.
Probably the biggest hurdle to the ﬁrst stage estimation is the observability of the state
variables, s. Estimation of the ﬁrst stage does not require that all states be observed.
In many cases unobserved states are recoverable in the ﬁrst stage estimation. Leading
examples of this include unobserved product characteristics in demand models (e.g. Berry
(1994), Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995)), and unobserved productivity shocks in
production functions (e.g. Olley and Pakes (1996)). In cases like these, the values of
the unobserved states are uniquely determined from the observed states and actions,
and so it is as if the unobserved states were observed. Once the unobserved states
are recovered, the ﬁrst stage policy functions can be estimated as before and even serial
correlation in the unobserved states is easily handled. In other examples, such as dynamic
discrete choice (e.g. Rust (1987), Hotz and Miller (1993), Hotz et al. (1993)) or dynamic
discrete games (e.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002a)), a parametric form is assumed for
the distribution of the unobserved states and therefore, even though the values of the
unobserved states are not uniquely determined by the observed variables, the ﬁrst stage
is still easily recovered.
Still, the ability to estimate the ﬁrst stage clearly places strong restrictions on the extent
9to which it is possible to allow for unobserved states, as well as the extent to which it is
possible to handle serially correlated unobserved states. However, characterizing these
restrictions is diﬃcult without the context of a detailed model so we instead discuss this
issue further in the examples in section 5.
3.2 Second Step
The ﬁrst step estimation typically recovers many, but not all, of the parameters of
interest. It is necessary to impose the dynamic equilibrium conditions in order to recover
parameters such as investment costs, adjustment costs, ﬁxed costs, entry and exit costs,
etc. This is the purpose of the second step estimation.
For notational simplicity, we assume that the set of actions as well as the set of possible
state variables are discrete. Our methods easily generalize to continuous problems (in-
deed, the dynamic oligopoly example involves continuous investment policies). We also
assume that the discount factor, β, is known. Assuming it is identiﬁed, there is some
scope for estimating the discount factor. However, the analysis is more straightforward
with this assumption.
Consider the optimality conditions for the strategy, σi, generated by the objective func-











where the expectations operator Eσi,σ−i|s0 refers to the expectation with respect to equi-
librium policies, starting from initial state s0, and the expectations operator Eσ0
i,σ−i|s0
refers to the same expectation only where agent i’s strategy is changed to σ0
i rather than
σi.
The system of inequalities given by (4) represents the information contained in the
model’s equilibrium assumption. Because the policy functions and transition probabili-
ties have been recovered at the ﬁrst step, the only unknowns in (4) are the period proﬁts.
A key point is that this system of inequalities is linear in these proﬁts.
Our main additional assumption is that the period proﬁt functions are known up to some
ﬁnite vector of parameters, θ = (θ1,...,θM), and moreover, that each proﬁt function is
6We remind readers that in practice, by the principle of dynamic programs, it is only necessary to
consider one-step deviations.
10linear in these parameters (we discuss this assumption in detail in the section below):
πi(a,s,νi) := Φi(a,s,νi) · θ. (5)
Here Φi(a,s,νi) is a M-dimensional vector of “basis functions” in a, s, and νi, φ1,...,φM.
If πi(a,s,νi) is linear, then the functions φj are simply the elements of (a,s,νi). More
generally, the functions φj could be polynomial, or other nonlinear, basis functions in
(a,s,νi).
Given this restriction, we can express the optimization inequalities (4), as a system that





Then the conditions for equilibrium are that for every i, initial state s0, and alternative
policy σ0
i:
W(s0;σi,σ−i) · θ ≥ W(s0;σ0
i,σ−i) · θ (6)
The primary diﬀerence between this set of equilibrium conditions and (4) is that the
parameter vector, θ, factors out linearly. This factorization results in a computational
savings in estimation because, as we will see, it means that the W terms need only be
computed once, rather than over and over for every value of θ. Computing the W terms
is the primary computational burden of the estimator so this reduction is substantial.7
3.3 The Linearity Assumption
The primary assumption reducing the computational burden of the estimator is the
linearity assumption in (5). First, note that the assumed linear representation in (5) is
stronger than required because many of the parameters of the period return function can
typically be estimated in the ﬁrst step along with the policy functions. Thus, the model
need not be linear in all the parameters, just those parameters that are to be estimated
in the second step.
7If the state and action spaces are both discrete and there are a small number of points in the state
space, then there is also a useful analytic matrix representation of the system (6): Let B be a matrix of
ones and zeros that picks out, for each (s,νi), the optimal action for agent i, ai = σi(s,νi), and ˜ B be
the same for the alternative policy σ
0. Let the vector, Φ
0θ, represent the period returns at each (s,a,νi)











11With this distinction, many dynamic oligopoly models in the literature satisfy the lin-
earity assumption. For example, entry, exit, and ﬁxed costs parameters enter additively
into a ﬁrm’s proﬁt function and so are naturally linear. Thus, dynamic entry models
typically satisfy this assumption. Investment cost and marginal cost parameters would
also typically enter proﬁts linearly. The dynamic oligopoly model is an example of a
class of models that is linear in the second step parameters (though highly nonlinear in
the ﬁrst step parameters).
Of course, it is also easy to write down models that are not linear in parameters. For
example, many dynamic pricing models would be nonlinear in the parameters. Addi-
tionally, if treated as a parameter to be estimated, the discount factor enters the system
nonlinearly. The inequalities (4) must still hold in these cases, and the estimation al-
gorithm described in the next section could still be used. However, the computational
burden of the algorithm would be higher because the parameters no longer factor out as
in (6).
In the event that the computational burden proved too high, an alternative approach
for nonlinear models would be to use a ﬂexible approximation to πi that is linear in
the second-step parameters. For example, a polynomial approximation could be used.
Alternatively, an Mth order Taylor expansion of the desired nonlinear proﬁt function
could be used. Note that while we believe that such an approach is likely to work well,
we have not attempted to explicitly derive the properties of an approximation estimator.
3.4 Identiﬁcation
Given observed behavior, σ, and transitions, P, the equilibrium inequalities, (6), deﬁne
a set of parameters that rationalize the data in the sense that the strategies, σ, are a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the game deﬁned by P and payoﬀ parameters θ. Let Θ0
be the set of parameters that rationalize the observed data,
Θ0(σ,P) := {θ : θ,σ,P satisfy (6) for all s0,i,σ0
i}. (8)
The goal of estimation is to learn this set. A natural way to proceed with estimation,
then, would be to construct empirical counterparts to the inequalities, (6), and then ﬁnd
the value(s) of θ that minimize the squared distance in violations of these inequalities.
This is the approach followed below.
The problem of identiﬁcation concerns whether or not the set Θ0 is a singleton. While
identiﬁcation can be shown for some dynamic decision problems (e.g. Rust (1994), Aguir-
regabiria and Mira (2002a,b), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003)), other models
12such as some entry models may not yield point identiﬁcation (see also Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003)). Even in non-identiﬁed models,
however, knowledge of the set Θ0 may convey useful information about the underlying
parameters (Manski and Tamer (2002), Haile and Tamer (2003)). We therefore proceed
by outlining two alternative approaches. The ﬁrst estimator requires that the model be
identiﬁed and yields standard point estimates as well as standard errors. The second es-
timator does not rely on identiﬁcation and instead yields consistent estimates of bounds
on the parameters. These approaches are discussed in detail in the next section.
Another issue with respect to identiﬁcation is the fact that agents’ beliefs can only be
learned on the recurrent class of states, R. In practice, this means that it is only possible
to implement the optimality inequalities for initial states that are in R. This limitation
would aﬀect the identiﬁability of proﬁt parameters that are only realized outside of R.
An example of parameters of this type would be parameters determining ﬁrm proﬁts in
a punishment regime that is never triggered by equilibrium play. Typically, knowledge
of the fact that the punishment regime is never triggered by equilibrium play would only
provide enough information to place bounds on such parameters.
4 Estimation and Asymptotic Theory
This section outlines an intuitive minimum distance (MD) approach designed to minimize
the squared distance in violations of the optimization inequalities in (6).
4.1 Notation and Assumptions
We maintain the assumption that the policy function and the transition probabilities
can be summarized by a parameter vector, α. That is, the policy function takes a known
parametric form, σi(s,νi;α), where σi is twice continuously diﬀerentiable in α. We also
assume that the transition probabilities have known parametric form, P(st+1|st,at;α),
and that the transition probabilities are twice continuously diﬀerentiable in α when
evaluated at the policy function ait = σi(st,νi;α). We denote the true policy function
parameters α0. This assumption holds in any model with a discrete state space and also
in continuous state space models where the parametric forms of the policy function and
transition probabilities are known.8
8We also believe that the estimation algorithm could be shown to work if the assumption were relaxed
to allow for a nonparametric ﬁrst stage on a continuous state space, but we have not proved this.
13Given an initial state, s0, the ﬁrst stage estimates of the policy function and the transition
probabilities provide all of the information needed to simulate equilibrium paths of states
and controls. The expected discounted value terms, W, can be estimated by simulating
many such paths, computing the discounted value of each basis function along each path,
and then averaging. The simulated W terms provide the basis for the MD estimator.
Note that this “forward” simulation procedure is similar to those of Hotz et al. (1993)
and Rust (1994) for single agent models. However, one diﬀerence is that Hotz et al.
(1993) and Rust (1994) require that the simulations be performed for every possible
action at every observed state. In our context there may be a large number of observed
states and inﬁnitely many alternative actions per agent per state. Therefore, such a
requirement would be computationally prohibitive. We instead perform the simulations
at only a small number of states and a small number of actions per state as follows.
Let x denote a particular (i,s0,σ0) combination, such that each value of x refers to one







and 1{g(x,θ;α) < 0} represent the indicator function for the event that g(·) is less than
zero, so that the optimality inequality deﬁned by x is not satisﬁed at θ.
4.2 Case 1: Estimation of Identiﬁed Models
The estimator is computed by sampling k = 1,...,nI inequalities (deﬁned by states and
alternative actions), denoted Xk, according to some known distribution, F, that is chosen
by the researcher. While this sampling distribution will have implications to the eﬃciency
of the estimator, the only requirement for consistency is that the distribution used must
have a support that yields identiﬁcation of the model. That is, this distribution must
place positive density on a set of optimality inequalities that makes Θ0 a singleton.
The true parameter vector, θ0, solves
min
θ∈Θ∗ Q(θ;α0) (9)




Furthermore, by assumption, no θ 6= θ0 solves this problem. Therefore, a natural way to
estimate θ0 would be to use a sample analog of (9).
14Let gns(x,θ;α) be an unbiased and smooth simulator for g(x,θ;α), where ns is the
number of simulation draws. Deﬁne the two-step minimum distance (MD) estimator as
follows,
Qn(b θ, b αn) = inf








Conditional on the ﬁrst stage estimates, the MD estimator minimizes the squared dis-
tance of the violations to the simulated optimality inequalities.9
In addition to the assumptions above, assume that









−→ g with probability 1 for every (θ,α). Additionally, E|gns(x,θ;α0)| < ∞ for
all x and all θ ∈ Θ∗.
(iv) limn→∞
n
nI = r < ∞ and limn→∞
n
ns = 0.
The ﬁrst assumption is standard and is largely technical. The second assumption says
that the ﬁrst stage estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. This would typi-
cally be satisﬁed by any ﬁrst stage estimator under consideration. The third assumption
says that the simulator is consistent and has ﬁnite ﬁrst moment. Again, this assumption
would typically be satisﬁed by any simulator under consideration. The last assumption
says that the number of inequalities (nI) and the number of simulation draws (ns) must
increase at least as fast as the number of ﬁrst stage observations. Since nI and ns are
chosen by the researcher and since the estimator has a low computational burden, these
assumptions are easily implemented.




9The objective function in 10 puts equal weight on each inequality. Presumably it would be more
eﬃcient to weight the inequalities diﬀerently to account for their diﬀering variances, as well as for
covariances between inequalities. The econometrics literature has yet to solve this problem for inequality
moment conditions and pursuing it further is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Proof. See appendix A.
Consistency requires both the number of inequalities sampled (nI) and the number of
simulation draws per inequality (ns) to go to inﬁnity at least as fast as the number of
ﬁrst stage observations (n). As a result of these assumptions, the simulation error does
not contribute to the asymptotic distribution of the estimator. The standard errors are
thus determined by ﬁrst stage sampling error, adjusted for its eﬀect on the second stage
estimates. Eﬃciency of the estimator does, however, depend on the distribution used to
sample over inequalities through the expectations operators in Λ0 and H0.
Derivation of an expression for Λ0 in terms of model primitives is diﬃcult because of
the complex way in which the ﬁrst stage parameters enter into the W terms. Therefore,
in practice we believe it will typically be easiest to use subsampling or the bootstrap to
estimate standard errors.10
4.3 Case 2: Bounds Estimation
In this section we show how to extend the estimation method to models where point
identiﬁcation is not known to hold. This might arise either because the model is known
to be underidentiﬁed, or simply because an identiﬁcation proof is diﬃcult to obtain.
We include this section because there have been several recent papers on non-identiﬁed
models in I.O. (Haile and Tamer (2003), Ciliberto and Tamer (2003)), and because the
estimation method extends naturally to this case.
10The proposition guarantees that subsampling will work. We do not have a proof that the bootstrap
works, but in monte carlo experiments it appears to work.
16The estimator used in this section is nearly identical to that described above. The
estimator converges to bounds in cases where the model is not identiﬁed, and converges
to a point if the model is identiﬁed. The primary cost of dropping the identiﬁcation
assumption is that the bounds estimator adds a small amount to the computational
burden of the estimator.
We maintain all of the assumptions from the last section, except we now assume nI is
ﬁxed. Let
e Θ0 ≡ {θ : θ,σ,P satisfy (5) for all xk, k = 1,...,nI}.
If x1,...,xnI represents all of the optimality inequalities implied by the model, then
e Θ0 = Θ0. More generally, e Θ0 is a superset of Θ0. By ﬁxing nI, we consider only
estimation of e Θ0.
Our estimator and the consistency theorem, closely resemble those for the MMD estima-
tor of Manski and Tamer (2002), as well as that of the semiparametric estimator of Haile
and Tamer (2003). The distribution theory for our estimator comes from Chernozhukov
et al. (2004).
In this section we employ the same estimator as in (10) except that now it is understood
that the optimality inequalities are ﬁxed at some chosen values rather than random:
Qn(b θ, b αn) = inf








Following Manski and Tamer (2002), we employ a slightly weakened version of the esti-
mator:
b Θn ≡ {θ : Qn(θ, b αn) ≤ min
γ∈Θ∗ Qn(γ, b αn) + µn} (12)
for some µn > 0, where µn
p
−→ 0. The term, µn, selects level sets of the objective
function.
Let ρ(b Θn, e Θ0) measure the distance from b Θn to e Θ0 and let ρ(e Θ0, b Θn) measure the distance
from e Θ0 to b Θn, as follows:




|θ1 − θ2| (13)




|θ1 − θ2| (14)
17Proposition 2. Under the assumptions listed above, (a)









ρ(e Θ0, b Θn)
p
−→ 0.
Proof. See appendix A.
Part (a) of the consistency theorem says that, for large n, every point in b Θn is close to a
point in e Θ0. This is guaranteed under conditions similar to those required for standard
estimators, and holds even if µn = 0 for all n. Part (b) of the consistency theorem says
that, for large n, every point in e Θ0 is close to a point in b Θn. Essentially this means that
all of the set e Θ0 is eventually captured by the estimator. In order for part (b) to hold,
it is necessary that µn go to zero slowly enough, with the required rate provided above.
The primary diﬃculty in estimation is computation of the set b Θn, which may potentially
be deﬁned by a very large number of inequalities. Fortunately, the inequalities are
linear in the parameters, and a variety of methods are available for the purpose of
solving such systems. One set of techniques in operations research, dating back to
Motzkin et al. (1954), uses the fact that b Θ is a convex polyhedron to describe it in
terms of its vertices. Computer code for solving for the vertices of the set, b Θ, is widely
available. Alternatively, Bajari and Benkard (2003) show how to construct a Gibbs
sampling procedure that produces simulation draws from a uniform distribution over
the set b Θ, at very low computational cost. These simulation draws can be used to
estimate bounds on the parameters, θ. Their method is particularly eﬃcient at handling
large numbers of inequalities, making it ideally suited to this problem. Finally, Manski
and Tamer (2002) and Haile and Tamer (2003) use simulated annealing to sample the
objective function and then construct one-dimensional bounds on the parameters.
Our model is similar to Example 1 in Chernozhukov et al. (2004) and therefore their
subsampling algorithm (Algorithm 2.1) can be used to estimate conﬁdence intervals for
the true parameter, θ0. This procedure is designed to produce a set, b Θ0.95 such that
Pr(θ0 ∈ b Θ0.95) ≥ 0.95.
In the context of our model, their procedure can be described as follows:
181. Begin with an initial estimate of b Θ0 representing a level set of the objective func-
tion. This estimate would typically be obtained by obtaining an approximate cutoﬀ
value such as that implied by the chi-squared (which falsely assumes that the model
is identiﬁed).
2. For all θ ∈ b Θ0.95, use subsampling to estimate the distribution of
n ∗ Qn(θ, b αn).
3. Using the subsampling estimates, estimate the cutoﬀ value, b cn, such that
sup
θ∈b Θ0.95
Pr(n ∗ Qn(θ, b αn) < b cn) = 0.95.
4. Use this new cutoﬀ value to estimate b Θ0.95.
Chernozhukov et al. (2004) shows that this procedure leads to a consistent estimate of
the set b Θ0.95.
5 Examples
5.1 Dynamic Discrete Choice
In this section we show how the estimation algorithm applies to the dynamic discrete
choice example presented earlier. Note that in this simple context the algorithm is very
similar to that of Hotz et al. (1993), with the main diﬀerence being the second step
procedure. The primary advantage of second step procedure in this paper is that it
extends easily to more general models such as the dynamic oligopoly example below.
We begin with the general dynamic discrete choice model presented in (2) and continue
with the Rust (1987) example below.
Much of the past literature (Keane and Wolpin (1997) is an exception) has made the
assumption that error terms, ν(a), are iid and have the extreme value distribution.
Here, because it generalizes the model without adding to the computational burden of
the second stage estimator, we instead assume that ν(a) is mean zero, iid over time,
and has a joint normal distribution with variance matrix, Vν. In that case, the policy
function P(aj|s) takes the form,
P(aj|s) = Pr(v(aj,s) + ν(aj) ≥ v(ak,s) + ν(ak), for all alternatives k) (15)
19where v(aj,s) satisﬁes







P(dνj0)P(ds0|s,a = aj). (16)
The function v(aj,s) is called the choice speciﬁc value function. It represents the agent’s
expected discounted utility from choosing the action j today, excluding today’s values
of the preference shock, ν(aj)).
Equation (15) can be used to estimate the policy function associated with this model. Let
f(M)(a,s;θ) be a ﬂexible function in a and s. Applying a probit model to the observed
conditional choice data provides ﬂexible estimates of the choice speciﬁc value functions,
b fM(a,s), as well as an estimate of the joint distribution of the preference shockes, b Vν.
Given these estimates, it is straightforward to construct the policy function,
σi(s,ν(a)) = aj if b f(M)(aj,s) + ν(aj) ≥ b f(M)(ak,s) + ν(ak) for all k.
Suppose the period return function is linear in the parameters,
πij(aj,s;θ) = Φ(aj,s) · θ.
























The system of inequalities above is the system, (6), in the context of the dynamic discrete
choice model. Note that the two systems are essentially identical except that here the
term representing the presented discounted value of the unobserved state variables factors
out as a separate term.
The policy functions, (16), along with the distributions for ν(a) and P(s0|a,s) can be
used to simulate the expectation terms in (17). Starting at a particular state, s0, a
vector of ν’s is drawn from a joint normal with variance matrix, b Vν. The policy, (16),
is then implemented to ﬁnd a0 and s1 (depending on the speciﬁc model, it may also
be necessary to draw s1 from the distribution P(s1|s0,a0)). This process is repeated to
construct one time series draw on a path of states and actions. Many such draws are
then used to simulate the expectations terms in (17).
Note that in this problem there are a continuum of alternative policies, given by alter-
native functions, e f(aj,s). In addition, if the discount factor is known, then this model
is typically identiﬁed (see Rust (1994)).
205.1.1 A Simple Monte Carlo
In this section we provide Monte Carlo evidence for the dynamic discrete choice model
using the simple machine replacement model of Rust (1987) presented earlier. In the
Monte Carlo exercise we set the maximum age of the machine to M = 5, with the
remaining parameters set to θ = 1, R = 4, and β = 0.9.
The ﬁrst stage estimates for this model are the average replacement probabilities in the
simulated data for the ﬁve states (age ∈ {1,2,3,4,5}). In the second stage estimates
we assumed that identiﬁcation held and implemented the MD estimator. Alternative
policies consisted of random draws from a normal distribution centered at the estimated
policy from the ﬁrst stage and with a standard deviation of 0.5. We computed the
estimator and standard errors 500 times for various values of n, ns and nI. One goal of
the experiment is to show that the estimator has practical value so we generally chose
very small values for n: 50, 100, 200, 400. The standard error estimates were obtained
using 25 subsamples of size n/2. Results are shown in Table 1.
The results in the table show several things. First, in this example the estimators are
close to unbiased for all but the smallest sample sizes. This need not be the case, but
since no smoothing was used in the ﬁrst stage it is not surprising. Second, the subsampled
standard errors are close to, though generally slightly smaller than, the true standard
errors. The diﬀerences are most likely due to the small sample sizes used, such that the
asymptotic approximations are imperfect.
We are also interested in the ability of the estimation approach to work on real world
data sets. Standard errors in all three cases were generally quite small. For n = 400,
the t-statistics were on the order of 6-8, while for n = 100 they fell to about 3-4. Even
the n = 50 case led to t-statistics on the order of 2. These results are quite encouraging
as in practice data sets would typically number more than 100 observations and often
much more than 400 observations.
5.2 Dynamic Oligopoly
In this section we show how the algorithm applies to the dynamic oligopoly example. We
ﬁrst cover the general model described earlier, and then proceed to a speciﬁc example.
215.2.1 Step 1: Estimating the Policy Functions
Standard techniques for estimating demand and supply, production functions, etc., can
be applied to estimating the demand function (qit(s,p;θ1)) and cost function (mc(sit,qit;θ2)).
The spot market equilibrium can then be solved for numerically, yielding the static por-
tion of proﬁts at every state (excluding the cost of investment). We denote the static
portion of proﬁts as ˜ π(at,st) below.
The transition probabilities, P(st+1|st,It), would typically be estimated parametrically
using maximum likelihood (see below for more details). We also assume that the ﬁrst
stage estimation provides estimates of (at least) the transition distributions of any un-
observed state variables, such that they can be simulated.
It is also necessary to estimate the investment policy function I(s,νi), as well as the entry
probability at each state, χe(s), and the exit policy function, χ(s,νi). As these functions
are determined in equilibrium, this would typically be done using some nonparametric
technique. Again, for details in a speciﬁc example, see the next subsection.
5.2.2 Step 2: Estimating the Dynamic Parameters
Step one provides estimates of many of the structural parameters. The remaining param-
eters to be estimated in step two are the parameters of the cost of investment function,
C(I,νi;θ3), the scrap value, Ψ, and the entry cost distribution, F(xe). Our method re-
quires linearity in these parameters. In general, the entry and exit costs enter the period
return linearly. We assume that the cost of investment function is also linear in a vector
of parameters, θ3,
C(I,νi) = θ3 · Φ(I,νi),
for some vector of basis functions, Φ(·). For example, one function that satisﬁes this
condition is,
C(I,νi;θ3) = θ3,0 + θ3,1 ∗ I + θ3,2 ∗ I2 + νi ∗ I.
Note that this function accomodates a ﬁxed cost of investment, as well as convex invest-
ment costs, and thus is quite liberal.
If an incumbent ﬁrm is making its investment and exit choices optimally, then it must be
the case that it would not be made better oﬀ by choosing an alternative policy, holding
the actions of rival ﬁrms ﬁxed at equilibrium levels. This implies that for every initial
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This system of inequalities can be used to estimate the investment cost function param-
eters, θ3, and the scrap value, Ψ.
In order to estimate the entry cost distribution note that, for a potential entrant, i,





βt (˜ πi(at,st) − C(Ii,νi;θ3) + {χ = 1}Ψ)
!
. (19)
Once θ3 and Ψ have been estimated, the expectations term on the right hand side can be
simulated for any state, s. For many states, the left hand side can be estimated directly
from the data. Thus, the distribution F(xE) can be estimated nonparametrically by
regressing the left hand side observations on the ride hand side simulated values in order
to obtain an estimate of F(xe).
If, in addition, the parametric form of the entry cost distribution is known, then equa-
tion (19) can be used to form a likelihood. Essentially, such an approach would be a
straightforward extension of Hotz and Miller (1993). Additionally, when the parametric
form for the entry distribution is known, (19) contains some overidentifying information
that could be used to help estimate the investment and exit costs. In practice, this would
be implemented by estimating the investment and exit costs parameters jointly with the
entry cost distribution parameters. We implement both versions of the estimator below.
5.2.3 A Simple Monte Carlo for a Diﬀerentiated Products Oligopoly
In this section we estimate a simple version of the dynamic oligopoly model above. The
model here is a slight modiﬁcation of the model computed in Pakes and McGuire (1994).
In the model, each ﬁrm has one state variable, sj, representing the quality of its product
relative to that of the outside good. Demand is given by a logit demand system where
the utility that consumer r derives from good j is,
Urj = γh(sj) + αln(yr − pj) + rj
where yr is income, γ and α are parameters, and rj is an iid logit error term. The
function h(·) is a concave function so that there are declining returns to investment.
23This ensures that the Markov chain of states generated by the model is stationary. For
simplicity, we also assume that all consumers have the same income, yr = y. The total
mass of consumers in the market is denoted M.
Each period, ﬁrms choose investment levels, Ij ∈ I R+, optimally to increase their product
quality the next period. Note that the choice of investment is continuous. The spec-
iﬁcation we use for the evolution of product quality is identical to that of Pakes and
McGuire (1994). Firm j’s investment is successful, in which case its quality moves up
by one, with probability
aIj/(1 + aIj),
where a is a parameter. If the ﬁrm’s investment is not successful, product quality remains
unchanged. There is also an outside good, whose quality moves up with probability δ
each period. The cost of investment function is given by11
c(I) = θ3,1 ∗ I.
The scrap value is denoted Ψ, and the random entry cost distribution is speciﬁed as
U[xl,xh]. Marginal costs are constant at mc.
For the monte carlo experiments, the parameters were set at the values shown in Table
2. Implementing the estimation algorithm is straightforward. However, it is diﬃcult to
properly test an estimation algorithm that is designed to be used in cases where equilib-
rium computation is infeasible. Therefore, in order to keep the equilibrium computation
simple, we considered a model in which a maximum of three ﬁrms could be active in each
period. We then generated data sets of varying numbers of periods, from 100-400. Typ-
ically, real world data sets would have more ﬁrms than this and fewer periods. However,
computing the equilibrium for models with large numbers of ﬁrms is prohibitive. Thus,
we instead chose period lengths for which the number of total ﬁrm-year observations is
comparable to available data sets.
We assumed that quantities, prices, product quality, income, and market size were ob-
served, and that the discount rate was known. It would be a straightforward extension
to make product quality unobserved. However, in that case it would be necessary to
have an instrument, such as an observed cost shifter, in order to estimate the demand
side of the model. This would be easy to handle in estimation (and probably would not
lead to diﬀerent results since it would only impact the ﬁrst stage), but would complicate
computation of the equilibrium of the model. All other parameters, including marginal
cost, are estimated.
11As far as the estimation is concerned, it would also be straightforward to include a shock to the
marginal cost of investment as above. Our reason for not doing so here is that it would somewhat
complicate the equilibrium computation required to generate the simulated data.
24All of the static parameters of the model can be estimated in the ﬁrst stage using maxi-
mum likelihood. The quantity, price, and product quality data was used to estimate the
demand parameters in a logit model. Marginal cost was estimated jointly with demand
using the static markup formula. The product quality data was also used (separately)
to estimate the investment evolution parameters. In general, these procedures resulted
in the demand parameters being recovered very precisely, and the investment evolution
parameters being recovered somewhat less precisely. These estimates are inputs to the
second stage of estimation.
The policy functions (investment, entry, exit) were estimated using local linear regression
with a normal kernel.12 The bandwidths were chosen by eye once and then held constant
across all of the monte carlos. The remaining parameters (θ3,1,Ψ) were then estimated
using the MD estimator on the system of inequalities (18). Alternative investment and
exit policies were obtained by adding a mean zero normally distributed error term to
the estimated ﬁrst stage investment and exit policies.13 In all of the monte carlos we
used ns = 2000 simulated paths, with each path being of length 80. Standard errors
were computed using 20 subsamples of size n/2. To show the computational burden of
the estimator, for these parameters, the computational burden of the second stage was
about one third that of the ﬁrst stage. Together they took less than one minute for
one estimation (not including subsampling), with the diﬀerence across sample sizes not
substantial enough to comment on. The results are shown in Table 3.
The ﬁrst thing that we noticed in the results is that, for these small sample sizes, there is a
slight bias in the estimates of the exit value. The bias is reduced with more observations,
and indeed we found that it goes away entirely if the true ﬁrst stage functions are used
instead of the estimated ﬁrst stage. We thus conclude that the second stage bias is
generated by bias in the ﬁrst stage local linear estimates. Note, however, that the
investment cost parameter estimates are essentially unbiased even for the smallest sample
size (n = 100). The diﬀerence between the two most likely reﬂects the diﬀerence in the
number of ﬁrst stage observations. For the n = 100 case there were typically about 250
investment observations, but only about 25 entry or exit observations. Thus, for any
given sample size, the investment policy function is substantially better estimated than
the entry and exit policy functions.
Similarly to the last example, the subsampled standard errors are on average slightly
smaller than the true standard errors. This is again likely due to the small sample sizes
used.
12We also tried using polynomials in the ﬁrst stage and found that they did not perform as well.
13The alternative investment policies had standard deviation 0.3 and the alternative exit policies had
standard deviation 0.5.
25We also wanted to get an idea for how well the estimators performed with these small
samples in order to evaluate their potential for use on real world data sets. For n = 400,
the results are extremely precise, with t-statistics on the order of 12-20. For the n = 100
case, in which there are very few observations of entry and/or exit, the standard errors
are still surprisingly small, with t-statistics averaging between 7 and 10. For such a
small data set it is clear that the ﬁrst stage estimates can not possibly be very accurate
pointwise. Thus, the estimation algorithm must be averaging across points in such a way
as to come up with precise parameter estimates anyway. Since real world data sets often
contain more observations than this last case, we believe that these results support the
method’s potential in applications.
In order to evaluate the potential for estimating the sunk cost of entry distribution,
we chose to ignore the prior knowledge that the entry costs were uniformly distributed
and instead estimated the entry cost distribution nonparametrically using a local linear
regression on equation (19).14 The results are shown in Figures 1-3. The ﬁgures show
that in all three cases the entry cost distribution is recovered surprisingly well. These
experiments show that it is easily possible to recover the distribution of entry costs with
reasonably sized data sets.
Finally, we also reestimated the model incorporating the correct parametric form for the
entry distribution. The most notable feature of the results (see Table 3) was that joint
estimation did not improve the estimates of the investment and exit costs parameters.
We conclude that in this model entry behavior contains very little information about the
investment and exit cost parameters.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes two new estimators for a large class of dynamic environments.
The estimators exploit the assumption that observed behavior is consistent with Markov
Perfect Equilibrium. In that case, agents’ beliefs can be recovered from observations
of equilibrium play. Once agents’ beliefs are known, the structural parameters can be
solved for using the optimality conditions for equilibrium.
The biggest advantage of the approach is that it avoids the need for equilibrium com-
putation. Avoiding equilibrium computation solves two problems. First, computing an
equilibrium even just once, for even the simplest of empirical dynamic oligopoly mod-
els, can be computationally prohibitive. In contrast, in the monte carlo experiments
14Note that these regressions were done without imposing that the fact that the distribution function
must be weakly monotonically increasing.
26we found that the overall computational burden of the new estimators tends to be no
more than that of many commonly used static estimation methods. Second, because
equilibrium beliefs are obtained from the data, there is no need for the researcher to
make assumptions about which of many potential equilibria is being played.
The primary cost of the approach is that, in reducing the computational burden, some
eﬃciency is compromised. However, the monte carlo experiments show that the approach
still works quite well for fairly small data sets. Furthermore, in the context of a game,
it is not clear that intermediate approaches, such as those of Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2002b), would necessarily improve eﬃciency.
Both estimators are also conceptually straightforward and relatively easy to program
in standard statistical packages. As there are currently many options in the literature
for estimating single agent dynamic models, we expect that the estimators will be most
useful in the context of dynamic games, a topic that has proven more diﬃcult. Our hope
is that the estimators will facilitate future empirical work on applications of dynamic
oligopoly.
27A Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
For ease of notation, let
h(x,θ;α) = 1{g(x,θ;α) < 0}g2(x,θ;α).
The asymptotic objective function is given by
Q(θ;α0) = Eh(x,θ;α0).
Lemma 1.
supθ∈Θ∗|Qn(θ, b αn) − Q(θ,α0)|
p
−→ 0.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the convergence of the simulator, gns. If a smooth simulator is used,




−→ 0 for all k.




Finally, since Qn(θ,α) is continuously diﬀerentiable in α and b αn
p
−→ α0, using a mean
value expansion it is easy to show that
supθ∈Θ∗|Qn(θ, b αn) − Q(θ,α0)|
p
−→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1a
Proof. We have assumed identiﬁcation and we have also assumed that the true parameter
lies in a compact set, and the lemma above shows uniform convergence. These are




Proof of Proposition 1b
28Proof. We will do the asymptotics in the number of ﬁrst stage observations, n. The rea-
son for this is that the number of inequalities sampled, nI, and the number of simulation
draws per inequality, ns, are both under the researcher’s control.































































The ﬁrst term is the standard term in the ﬁrst order expansion. Note that in this case
it is always zero (since h is always zero at the true values of the parameters) and thus
drops out completely. This is because of the lack of sampling error in the second stage.
The second term is the simulation bias term. Even if an unbiased simulator is used for g,
in general hns is not unbiased for h, and therefore the derivative term in the expansion
is not unbiased either. Doing a second order mean value expansion of one element in the







= {g(Xk,θ0;α0) < 0} ∗ 2 ∗ g(Xk,θ0;α0) ∗ [gns(Xk,θ0;α0) − g(Xk,θ0;α0)]+
{g∗
ns(Xk,θ0;α0) < 0} ∗ [gns(Xk,θ0;α0) − g(Xk,θ0;α0)]
2 (21)
where g∗









ns(Xk,θ0;α0) < 0}∗V ar(gns(Xk,θ0;α0)) (22)
Since g∗
ns → g, this term goes to zero at rate ns. Therefore, so long as ns goes to inﬁnity
faster than
√
n the second term contributes nothing to the asymptotic variance.
The third term is the simulation variance term. It is mean zero by construction and,
if independent draws are used for each inequality, it is the sum of independent terms.
29Therefore, a CLT applies and the second term is asymptotically normal with rate
√
nI
and variance matrix that disappears with ns. Therefore, under the assumption above
that ns goes to inﬁnity faster than
√
n, this term also contributes nothing to the asymp-
totic variance.
The fourth term is the ﬁrst stage sampling error term. Doing a mean value expansion


























n(b αn − α0) (23)











−→ Λ0 ≡ E
∂2h(Xk,θ0;α0)
∂θ∂α0 (24)
Therefore, so long as nI goes to inﬁnity with n,, the fourth term has limiting distribution,
N(0,Λ0VαΛ0).











and H0 = H(θ0). Note that while the hessian of the objective function is discontinuous,
we will assume that H0 exists and is positive deﬁnite (i.e., the asymptotic criterion
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable at θ0). This assumption is justiﬁed as it
would typically be the case for any model that is locally identiﬁed.
Under some additional regularity conditions (stochastic diﬀerentiability or stochastic
equicontinuity), a standard expansion gives:
√
n(b θ − θ0)
d −→ N(0,H−1(Λ0VαΛ0
0)H−1). (27)
30We will not directly show these additional regularity conditions here but instead note
that we believe that they are likely to hold. Each term in the objective function is twice
diﬀerentiable at all points except those where the indicator function is discontinuous.
Furthermore, each term is discontinuous at a diﬀerent set of points. Finally, each term
eventually has a negligible impact on the function, and the asymptotic criterion function
is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (a) Part a of the proof is similar to that of Manski and Tamer (2002), Proposition
5a. Since the parameter space, Θ∗, is compact and µn
p
−→ 0, to prove the result it suﬃces
to show that Qn(θ, b αn) converges to Q(θ,α0) uniformly on Θ∗. This has been established
in the lemma above.
(b) The proof of part b is identical to that of Manski and Tamer, Proposition 5b.
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33A Tables and Figures
Table 1: DDC Monte Carlo, 500 Monte Carlo runs, 25 subsamples of size n/2
Mean SE(Real) 5%(Real) 95%(Real) SE(Subsampling)
n = 400, nI = 200, ns = 1000
θ 1.00 0.14 0.79 1.24 0.10
R 4.02 0.53 3.24 4.96 0.39
n = 200, nI = 200, ns = 500
θ 0.99 0.18 0.72 1.37 0.17
R 4.00 0.78 2.94 5.95 0.86
n = 100, nI = 200, ns = 250
θ 0.94 0.32 0.47 1.48 0.35
R 3.75 1.26 1.92 5.70 1.15
n = 50, nI = 200, ns = 150
θ 0.89 0.54 0.11 2.03 0.47
R 3.57 2.35 0.60 8.16 2.27
34Table 2: Dynamic Oligopoly Monte Carlo Parameters
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Demand: Investment Cost:
α 1.5 θ3,1 1
γ 0.1
M 5 Marginal Cost:
y 6 mc 3
Investment Evolution Entry Cost Distribution
δ 0.7 xl 7
a 1.25 xh 11
Discount Factor Scrap Value:
β 0.925 Ψ 6
Table 3: Dynamic Oligopoly With Nonparametric Entry Distribution
Mean SE(Real) 5%(Real) 95%(Real) SE(Subsampling)
n = 400, nI = 500
θ3,1 1.01 0.05 0.91 1.10 0.03
Ψ 5.38 0.43 4.70 6.06 0.39
n = 200, nI = 500
θ3,1 1.01 0.08 0.89 1.14 0.05
Ψ 5.32 0.56 4.45 6.33 0.53
n = 100, nI = 300
θ3,1 1.01 0.10 0.84 1.17 0.06
Ψ 5.30 0.72 4.15 6.48 0.72
35Table 4: Dynamic Oligopoly With Parametric Entry Distribution
Mean SE(Real) 5%(Real) 95%(Real) SE(Subsampling)
n = 400, nI = 500
θ3,1 1.01 0.06 0.92 1.10 0.04
Ψ 5.38 0.42 4.68 6.03 0.41
xl 6.21 1.00 4.22 7.38 0.26
xh 11.2 0.67 10.2 12.4 0.30
n = 200, nI = 500
θ3,1 1.01 0.07 0.89 1.13 0.05
Ψ 5.28 0.66 4.18 6.48 0.53
xl 6.20 1.16 3.73 7.69 0.34
xh 11.2 0.88 9.99 12.9 0.40
n = 100, nI = 300
θ3,1 1.01 0.10 0.84 1.17 0.06
Ψ 5.43 0.81 4.26 6.74 0.75
xl 6.38 1.42 3.65 8.43 0.51
xh 11.4 1.14 9.70 13.3 0.58
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